Theory and Reality (2003) by Peter Godfrey-Smith

 

Theory and Reality (2003) by Peter Godfrey-Smith 

Can we truly know what we can’t perceive?

This is a book about how science interprets reality with its philosophies and structure. And it explores this topic mainly through the lenses of empiricism (the belief that all knowledge comes from our direct experience), naturalism (an approach that sees science as an evolving resource for tackling the philosophical pursuit of belief and justification), and scientific realism (which aims for objective knowledge of the world as it exists, even beyond our perception).

One of the most interesting discussions here is on the social structure of scientific communities, and how (like in economics) self-interest in individuals actually benefits the masses. Scientists are incentivized by merit in the form of publication and credit for discoveries, which inherently creates a system of checks and balances for scientific theories. Those with opposing theories must test against data for verification, and those aiming to build their own work on existing theories must do the same. The social structure of science also helps diversify the distribution of researchers across competing projects in a field, as theories with greater apparent potential attract through a higher chance of success, but less individual gain as the reward is spread across a greater pool; whereas more fringe theories attract through greater individual gains from a smaller pool of researchers, but at greater odds. 

Godfrey-Smith also presents several competing theories on paradigm shifts in the scientific community. There is a case for “normal science” (which operates rigidly within a defined framework for a field) devolving into “crisis science” as its tenets are found to fail against testing, and resulting in the birth of an entirely fresh framework to renew the cycle. Likewise, there is the case for competing “scientific programs” that exist simultaneously and evolve to reflect discoveries both within the programs and across the programs at-large. There is even discussion about the merits and pitfalls of a completely laissez-faire approach to science, which rejects the formality of “normal science” to produce more striking theories, but can be too quick to abandon those theories without seeing them through thoroughly.

The sociology of science also extends beyond the structure of the scientific community. It deals with how our cultures, backgrounds, and biases affect research and theories. Godfrey-Smith notes a debate similar to the “art-imitates-life / life-imitates-art” question, on whether our cultural climates influence science, or the other way around. Many sociologists posit that, rather than being a universal ideal, science can only be properly judged with respect to the cultural framework within which it is produced. I personally don’t like this concept, but at the same time I can’t deny it. Godfrey-Smith even spends a chapter reflecting on whether underrepresentation of certain voices in the world of science (most specifically, women), hinders its progress in a measurable way.

The most compelling topic of Theory and Reality is the debate about whether our scientific theories describe the world as it truly is, in an objective sense, or merely fabricate the lens through which we perceive the world, in a more relativistic sense. “Constructivism”, as radical as it may sound on the surface, sees reality as a product created by our scientific reasoning. Or, more moderately, it sees our theories and classifications as constructed products WITHIN an objective reality. The question is posed whether or not science should even strive at describing objective reality in the first place, if our empirical observations are all we can truly rely on.

I was surprised to learn that, in modern philosophy of science, “causation” and “laws of nature” are dubious subjects. But that’s mostly an issue of interpretation, where “laws” are now seen simply as the arrangement of patterns in nature, rather than the cause of them.

Unlike other philosophy of science books I’ve read, I was relieved to find that this one didn’t put so much focus on the linguistic side of things. In my opinion, way too much weight is attributed to the language we use to communicate “belief”, “truth”, and “justification”, rather than the principles we’re trying to justify and explain in the first place. Godfrey-Smith even explains that language isn’t the only avenue for communicating these concepts (for example, we have models that communicate perfectly well without instigating linguistic debates).

In his discussions of scientific theory across history and in modern frameworks, Godfrey-Smith leans toward the necessity of holism as well as context. He recognizes that theories don’t operate in isolation, that science evolves, and that its fields have distinctions which prevent “one-size fits all” approaches to (and explanations of) scientific phenomena. 

Apologies for the scatterbrained rambling and summarizing here - but I think my key takeaway from this book is that science is an evolving, idealized pursuit of truth, rather than truth itself. It is subject to the same pressures of self-interest, cultural influence, and bias as anything else. But it has mechanisms and frameworks to help make reliable progress nonetheless. Science doesn’t just explain the world objectively from the outside. It’s embedded within the world it describes - analyzing it, affecting it, and shaping how we know and live in it.